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Workers’ Compensation.  Lang v. Municipal Employees’ 
Retirement System of R.I., 222 A.3d 912 (R.I. 2019).  The Workers’ 
Compensation Court (WCC) has jurisdiction over appeals by parties 
who had applied for accidental disability retirement allowance and 
were subsequently denied.  Further, occupational cancer is 
considered a compensable injury, as determined by the WCC’s 
interpretation of Rhode Island General Laws section 28-34-2(33) 
with the date of disability determined under section 28-34-6. 
Finally, the Rhode Island Supreme Court inferred the General 
Assembly’s intent that a firefighter must first prove an 
occupational cancer exists before receiving occupational cancer 
benefits, interpreting that there is no conclusive presumption that 
all cancer in firefighters is considered occupational.  
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In 1996, Petitioner Kevin Lang (Lang) began his career as a 
firefighter for the City of Cranston.1  He had a long and successful 
career until September 2012 when his colon cancer diagnosis 
suddenly ended his time with the fire department.2  Following this 
diagnosis, the City of Cranston “placed him on injured-on-duty 
status,” in accord with R.I. General Law section 45-19-1.3  This 
allowed Lang to receive salary benefits from the City.4  In January 
2014, Lang applied for accidental disability benefits pursuant to 
section 45-21.2-9, and, in July 2015, the Retirement Board of the 
Municipal Employees Retirement System of Rhode Island (the 
Board) denied his application after Lang could not prove that his 
cancer arose out of his job as a firefighter.5  Lang then appealed the 
decision to the Workers’ Compensation Court (WCC).  It is critical 
to note that the Board notified him of his ability to appeal only to 
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the Rhode Island Superior Court, but Lang chose to appeal to the 
WCC, claiming that section 45-21.2-9(f) gave the Workers’ 
Compensation Court subject matter jurisdiction.6 
The Municipal Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island 
(the Respondent) filed a motion to dismiss Lang’s appeal, claiming 
that the WCC lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that his claim 
should be filed in the Superior Court, as they originally suggested.7  
That motion was swiftly denied by the trial judge.8 
Lang filed a motion for summary judgment in the WCC, 
asserting that section 45-19.1-1 offered the complete presumption 
that all cancers contracted by firefighters are related to their 
employment.9  Petitioner included three affidavits from Lang, 
Raymond Chaquette, M.D. (Lang’s oncologist), and the Chief of the 
Cranston Fire Department, which served to establish Lang’s long 
employment as a firefighter, his cancer diagnosis, and his 
placement on injured-on-duty status.10  Among other records, 
reports from five physicians noted that Lang was permanently 
disabled but the physicians could not conclusively state that Lang’s 
cancer resulted from his employment.11   
In a written decision, the trial court judge reversed the Board’s 
determination and stated that section 45-19.1-1(b) “creates a 
conclusive presumption that all cancer in firefighters . . . arises out 
of and in the course of their employment” and granted Lang 
accidental disability retirement benefits.12  The Respondent 
appealed to the Appellate Division.  The Appellate Division 
affirmed the trial judge’s ruling that the WCC had subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear the claim regarding whether section 45-19.1-1 
created a total presumption that a cancer diagnosis in firefighters 
arises out of and in the course of their employment.13  The 
Respondent sought reversal of the WCC decree, contending the 








13. Id. at 913.
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chapter of the general laws did not allow for the presumption that 
all cancer in firefighters arises out of their employment.14  The 
Respondent filed a writ of certiorari, which the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court granted.15 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
A review of certiorari is “limited to an examination of the record 
to determine if an error of law has been committed.”16  On review, 
the record should be inspected beyond just searching for judicial 
error(s) to identify any legally competent evidence to “support 
findings of the hearing of justice.”17  The Supreme Court performed 
a review of the questions of statutory interpretation de novo, 
allowing the Court to give effect to the “purpose of the act as 
intended by the legislature.”18  Justice Indeglia further explained 
that “when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this 
Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words 
of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings,” but when the 
language is ambiguous, the Court turns to “well-established 
maxims of statutory construction” to determine legislative intent.19  
Finally, the Court noted that it would not construe a statute in a 
way that reaches an absurd result.20   
Under this standard of review, the Supreme Court analyzed 
several statutory provisions relating to this case.21  
A. Relevant Statutes
Because the Court was tasked with determining the interplay
between several statutory provisions, the Court provided an 
overview of the relevant statutes.  First, section 45-19-1 generally 
grants salary benefits to firefighters injured on duty.22  Subsection 
14. Id.
15. Id. at 914.
16. Id. at 914–15 (quoting Plante v. Stack, 109 A.3d 846, 853 (R.I. 2015)).
17. Id. at 915 (quoting Plante, 109 A.3d at 853).
18. Id. (quoting Bluedog Capital Partners, L.L.C. v. Murphy, 206 A.3d 694,
699 (R.I. 2019)). 
19. Id. (quoting In re B.H., 194 A.3d 260, 264 (R.I. 2018)).
20. Id. (quoting In re B.H., 194 A.3d at 264).
21. Id.
22. Id.
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(j) was created to provide an amendment clarifying that any person
receiving such benefits should apply for an accidental disability
retirement allowance within eighteen months of injury at the risk
of losing their injured-on-duty benefits should they neglect that
obligation.23  Subsection two of section 45-19-1(j) clarifies that
injured-on-duty payments will terminate in the event that the
WCC, in a final ruling, allows accidental disability payments.24
Next, section 45-21.2-9 provides the aforementioned accidental
disability retirement allowance benefits to firefighters who are in
need due to a mental or physical injury sustained while in the line
of duty.25  An amendment to this statute, subsection (f), provides
that if a party is “aggrieved by the determination of the retirement
board pursuant to § 45-19-1,” that party may appeal to the Rhode
Island WCC.26  Finally, section 45-19.1—“Cancer Benefits for Fire
Fighters”—provides certain benefits to firefighters diagnosed with
a “disabling occupational cancer.”27
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In reviewing whether the WCC had subject matter
jurisdiction,28 the Court conducted a de novo review.29  Respondent 
raised three arguments supporting his claim that the WCC did not 
have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeals.30  First, 
Respondent argued that the Appellate Division of the WCC “erred 
when it affirmed the trial [j]udge’s determination” that the WCC 
had subject matter jurisdiction because the unambiguous language 
in section 45-21.2-9 allows the WCC jurisdiction when the Board 
has made a determination pursuant to section 45-19-1 only, 




26. Id. (quoting 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-21.2-9).
27. Id. at 916 (quoting 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-19.1-3(a)).
28. A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction questions the “very power of
the court to hear the case” and is reviewed de novo.  Id. (quoting Sullivan v. 
Coventry Mun. Emps’ Ret. Plan, 203 A.3d 483, 487 (R.I. 2019)).  
29. Id. (quoting Sullivan, 203 A.3d at 487).
30. Id.
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45-21.2-9.31  The Court rejected Respondent’s argument.32  The
Court determined that the WCC had jurisdiction over the appeals
rendered by the Board, so long as the appeal was filed pursuant to
the time mandate in section 45-19-1(j), as was the intent of the
General Assembly.33  The Court stated the statute must not be
construed so literally as to result in absurdities or a defeating
purpose of the enactment.34  The Court further explained that to
accept Respondent’s argument would be tantamount to
determining that the General Assembly created an appeal
opportunity that would have no effect because the “board will never
render a decision pursuant to § 45-19-1.”35  The Court found that
this would result in an absurd result that would contradict the
General Assembly’s intent.36  Furthermore, the Court interpreted
the General Assembly’s intent so as to give the WCC jurisdiction
over appeals by parties who applied for an accidental disability
retirement allowance and were denied by the board by pointing to
section 45-19-1(j) to reveal that the statute is unambiguous in
instructing a person to apply for such allowance from the state
under section 45-21.2-9, and to await the Board’s decision, which
they may appeal pursuant to section 45-21.2-9(f), not section
45-19-1.37  Finally, the Court pointed to section 28-30-1(a), which
“grants the WCC jurisdiction that may be necessary to carry out its
duties,” into which appeals would fall.38
Second, the Respondent argued that the WCC lacked 
jurisdiction because occupational cancer and injury are different, 
and occupational cancer is not an injury within the meaning of 
section 45-21.2-9.39  The Respondent claimed that section 
45-21.2-9(a) provides accidental disability retirement allowance for
injury but section 45-21.2-9(f) allows such allowance for
occupational cancer and states that, if the General Assembly
31. Id.
32. See id. (quoting O’Connell v. Walmsley, 156 A.3d 422, 428 (R.I. 2007)).
33. See id. at 917.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 916.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 917 (quoting § 45-19-1(j)(2)).
38. Id. (citing O’Connell v. Walmsley, 156 A.3d 422, 426 (R.I. 2007)).
39. Id.
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intended the two to be the same, they would have written it as 
such.40  The Court rejected the Respondent’s argument and 
determined that the General Assembly intended occupational 
cancer to be considered an injury for the purposes of WCC appeal 
provisions.41  The Court noted that the Respondent was not wrong 
in the assertion that the relevant statutory sections do provide 
allowance for injury and occupational cancer separately, however 
the Court stated section 45-21.2-9(e) provides that an applicant is 
entitled to “all of the benefits provided for” in the chapter.42  The 
Court reasoned that this interpretation allows an applicant with 
occupational cancer to receive the benefits reserved for an “injured” 
applicant.43  The Court found further support for its interpretation 
in section 28-35-11, which provides that “all questions arising 
under . . . Rhode Island general law § 45-21.2-9 shall . . . be 
determined by the Workers’ Compensation Court.”44  With no 
language that unequivocally states that appeals concerning 
occupational cancer are to be treated differently, the Court 
concluded that the General Assembly “intended to provide the WCC 
with jurisdiction.”45 
Third, the Respondent argued that the WCC erred in 
identifying cancer as an occupational disease and in considering the 
date of diagnosis the date of injury.46  The Respondent looked to 
section 45-21.2-9(j) and claimed the WCC was only granted 
authority to use “case-management procedures and dispute-
resolution processes, but not its substantive law, in determining an 
appeal.”47  The Court, again, rejected this argument concluding 
that it is a far too rigid and hyper-technical interpretation of the 
statute.48  The Court reasoned that the aforementioned statute 
requires that all proceedings within the WCC must be filed 
40. Id.
41. Id. at 918.
42. Id. at 917 (quoting § 45-21.2-9(e)).
43. See id.
44. Id. at 917–18 (quoting 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-35-11).
45. See id. at 918.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. (citing In re B.H., 194 A.3d 260, 264 (R.I. 2018); O’Connell v.
Walmsley, 156 A.3d 422, 428 (R.I. 2007)). 
986 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:980 
pursuant to the statute and are subject to the provisions of chapters 
29-38.49  However, the statute “contains no limiting language” that
the General Assembly could have included had that been their
intention and, therefore, the Court construed the General
Assembly’s intent to be that appeals filed with the WCC pursuant
to section 45-21.2-9(j) are “not limited to case-management
procedures only.”50  Therefore, the WCC had properly ensured its
jurisdiction and properly determined that occupational cancer is a
compensable injury with the date of injury as the date of diagnosis,
according to sections 28-34-2(33) and 28-34-6, respectively.51
Consequently, the Court affirmed the decree that the WCC had
jurisdiction to hear the Petitioner’s appeal.52
C. Conclusive Presumption
Regarding conclusive presumption, the Respondent argued
that the WCC “erred when it determined that § 45-19.1-1 creates a 
conclusive presumption that any diagnosis of cancer among 
firefighters is an “occupational cancer.”53  The Respondent asserted 
that the General Assembly did not intend to create a conclusive 
presumption because there is no language expressly creating such 
presumption, as seen in other statutes.54  Furthermore, the 
Respondent maintained that the phrase “occupational cancer” 
would be redundant and meaningless, and the General Assembly 
has elsewhere created presumptions for health impairments of 
firefighters and assigned that duty to municipalities.55  The Court 
agreed with the Respondent’s argument, holding that section. 
45-19.1 does not contain a conclusive presumption that all cancers
in firefighters are occupational cancers.56  The Court determined
that, in order to show that a firefighter is unable to perform his or
her duties because of an occupational cancer, as required by section
45-19.1-3, the firefighter must prove a causal connection between




53. Id. at 919.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 922.
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the disease and his or her employment as a firefighter.57  The Court 
explained that this means the cancer must have arisen out of the 
Respondent’s employment via exposure to poisons, toxins, chemical 
substances, smoke,58 or other harsh conditions that many 
firefighters are exposed to, according to section 45-19.1-1(a).59  The 
Court further reasoned that by specifically defining “occupational 
cancer” in section 45-19.1-2(d) and requiring a firefighter to prove 
his or her cancer arose out of the employment, the General 
Assembly had no intention of creating a conclusive presumption.60  
In staying consistent with the promise not to construe a statute to 
reach an absurd result, the Court recognized that the language in 
section 45-19.1-1 does not create a conclusive presumption and that 
interpreting it to do so would render the statutory definition of 
“occupational cancer” meaningless, which would be an absurd 
result.61 
Finally, the Respondent argued that reliance on the holding in 
City of East Providence v. International Association of Firefighters 
Local 850 (IAF Local 850), 982 A.2d 1281 (R.I. 2009) was 
misplaced.62  The Court agreed with the Respondent’s argument on 
this point.63  The Court reasoned that the Court’s task in IAF Local 
850 was not to provide an interpretation of section 45-19.1, but 
rather “to determine whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority 
by rendering an irrational decision,” and, therefore, the Court’s 
holding did not determine what type of cancer a firefighter would 
have to prove in order to receive occupational cancer disability 
benefits.64  Finally, the Court drew the distinction that in the 
present case, the Court had to address the interpretation of chapter 
19.1 on de novo review.65 
57. See id. at 921.




62. Id. at 919.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 920 (citing Providence v. Int’l Assoc. of Firefighters Local
850, 982 A.2d 1281, 1285 (R.I. 2009)). 
65. Id.
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D. Justice Robinson’s Concurrence
Justice Robinson concurred with the conclusion reached by the
majority and its interpretation of the relevant statutory 
provisions.66  Justice Robinson wrote separately, however, to 
reiterate his belief that “there are occasions when it is important 
for the General Assembly to speak with stark clarity when it wishes 
to enact into law a provision that represents a departure from the 
usual.”67  Justice Robinson argued that the Court is required to look 
at what the statute actually says rather than to speculate about the 
intent of the legislators.68  Accordingly, Justice Robinson stated the 
General Assembly must be particularly clear as to its intent so that 
the Court can properly apply the statute to the case at hand.69 
E. Justice Flaherty’s Opinion: Concurring in Part, Dissenting in
Part
Justice Flaherty concurred in part and dissented in part, 
stating that he was in complete agreement with the majority on the 
jurisdictional issue.70  However, Justice Flaherty disagreed with 
the majority’s conclusion on the conclusive presumption, arguing 
that the statutory framework does provide that a diagnosis of 
cancer entitles a firefighter to an accidental disability pension.71  
Justice Flaherty asserted that section 45-19.101(a) unambiguously 
expresses the General Assembly’s intent to have a conclusive 
presumption that all cancer in firefighters is caused by the toxins 
and dangerous working conditions they are exposed to in the course 
of their employment.72  By discussing the effects of exposure to 
dangerous toxins as including slowly manifested cancers, Justice 
Flaherty argued, the General Assembly must have intended for 
cancer in firefighters to be presumed as arising from their 
employment.73  Justice Flaherty reasoned that section 45-19.1-1(b) 
66. Id. at 926 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 927.
70. Id. at 922 (Flaherty, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
71. Id.
72. See id. at 923.
73. See id.
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serves as evidence of the General Assembly’s intent to create the 
presumption that cancer in firefighters arose out of their 
employment where it provides that “the General Assembly finds 
and declares that all of the previously stated conditions exist and 
arise out of or in the course of their employment,” which serves as 
evidence of the General Assembly’s intent to create the 
presumption that cancer in firefighters arose out of their 
employment.74  Furthermore, Justice Flaherty argued that the 
majority, although attempting to distance itself from the language 
in IAF Local 850, fell short of that goal because the Court held that 
section 45-19.1 was clear and unambiguous and the arbitrator did 
not exceed his authority.75   
COMMENTARY 
In the case at hand, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
acknowledged the importance of properly interpreting the General 
Assembly’s legislative intent, doing so de novo.76  As such, the Court 
spent ample time reviewing and discussing its processes in coming 
to the interpretation that it did for each relevant statutory 
provision.77  Further, the Court remained committed to avoiding an 
absurd result in any interpretation of statutory language.78  In 
doing so, the Court set out to find a balance between proper 
interpretation of statutory language and a fair application of the 
statutes to both parties.  The Court made an impressive effort to 
take care to review every relevant statutory provision and to 
understand the process by which an appeal of the Retirement Board 
of the Municipal Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island 
decisions must be handled.  By reviewing each statutory provision 
as necessary, the Court determined that Lang properly appealed to 
the Workers’ Compensation Court, holding that the WCC had 
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the General Assembly’s 
intent.79  
74. See id.
75. Id. at 925.
76. See id. at 915.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 916.
79. See id. at 922.
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Regarding the presumption that all cancers in firefighters are 
caused by a firefighter’s employment, the Court determined that 
there was no such presumption.80  However, the dissenting opinion 
brings to light an important consideration—that one statutory 
provision, section 45-19.1-1(b), states that any previously stated 
condition (cancer included) arises out of the course of a firefighter’s 
employment.81 Although the majority did not agree, this 
disagreement highlights the importance of balancing a strict and 
rigid reading of the statute with the apparent legislative intent of 
the General Assembly. 
By holding that the WCC had jurisdiction, the Supreme Court 
removed any doubt that future appeals could be heard by the WCC. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court made it very clear that 
firefighters, in order to receive accidental disability retirement 
allowance due to a cancer diagnosis, must be able to prove that their 
cancer diagnosis arose out of their employment as a firefighter.82  
This is a strict standard.  However, the majority decision did not 
state by what standard of proof or by what means a firefighter could 
prove such connection, which could pose challenges for future 
petitioners.   
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the Workers’ 
Compensation Court had jurisdiction to hear the Petitioner’s appeal 
and affirmed the trial court’s decision in relevant part.83  However, 
the Court held that section 45-19.1 contains no conclusive 
presumption that all cancer in firefighters is an “occupational 
cancer.”84  Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court’s decision  
80. Id.
81. See id. at 923.
82. See id. at 921.
83. Id. at 922.
84. Id.  The Rhode Island legislature recently amended the statute at issue
in this survey to clarify that “[i]f any type of cancer is found in a firefighter, 
then it is conclusively presumed to be an occupational cancer arising out of 
their employment as firefighters.”  See 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-19.1-4. 
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in regard to the conclusive presumption that all cancer in 
firefighters is occupational cancer. 
Hannah L. Devoe 
